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Population and income growth tend to increase the
demand for agricultural land (Hertel, Ramankutty, &
Baldos, 2014; Platteau, 1996). In the absence of robust insti-
tutions, the resulting land scarcity instigates conversion of
forest land, especially in the global South (Bhattarai &
Hammig, 2001). Agriculture is one of the most important
drivers of deforestation worldwide, becoming a major envi-
ronmental concern and the target of global policy initiatives
(Gibbs et al., 2010; Kissinger, Herold, & De Sy, 2012;
Phelps, Carrasco, Webb, Koh, & Pascual, 2013; Pu¨lzl &
Rametsteiner, 2002).
While deforestation in developing countries is primarily dri-
ven by rising demand for agricultural and forestry products
(World Bank, 2007), micro-level determinants and institu-
tional factors, such as the role of land markets, remain
under-examined. Farm households in developing countries
access land through different pathways, including inheritance
and inter-vivo transfers, community membership, appropria-
tion of forest land, market transactions, and occasionally coer-
cive or non-coercive state interventions (de Janvry & Sadoulet,
2001). Increasing land scarcity could potentially lead to a shift
from common property to individual property rights regimes
with land market transactions becoming more prominent for
households to acquire cultivable land (Fitzpatrick, 2006;
Platteau, 1996). While some argue that markets could be an
efficient mechanism to allocate land to its most productive
use (Wallace & Williamson, 2006; Zimmerman & Carter,
1999), others contend that institutional constraints could sup-
press economically and socially desirable outcomes (Deininger
& Jin, 2008; Deininger, Jin, & Nagarajan, 2009; Holden,
Otsuka, & Place, 2009).335There exists a large body of literature analyzing the concep-
tual relationship between land market development and forest
conservation (e.g., Barbier, 2001; Bhattarai & Hammig, 2001;
Geist & Lambin, 2002). There are also several studies that
investigated farm households’ participation in land markets
in developing countries (e.g., Deininger & Jin, 2008;
Deininger, Zegarra, & Lavadenz, 2003; Deininger et al.,
2009). However, surprisingly little empirical evidence exists
about the effect of land market development on deforestation.
This effect is not straightforward to predict, because the emer-
gence of land markets often coincides with the emergence of
private property rights, and the effect of private property
rights on deforestation itself is not unambiguous (Alston,
Libecap, & Schneider, 1996; Araujo, Bonjean, Combes,
Motel, & Reis, 2009; Godoy, Kirby, & Wilkie, 2001; Liscow,
2013; Place & Otsuka, 2001). Stronger property rights and
tenure security could prompt landholders to discount the
future less, thus being more likely to realize long-term benefits
of forests as opposed to short-term benefits from land conver-
sion. However, stronger property rights could also increase
incentives to invest in productive activities such as cash crops
(Fenske, 2011; Grimm & Klasen, 2015; Lawry et al., 2016). A
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land tenure security and the rate of deforestation (Robinson,
Holland, & Naughton-Treves, 2014). But the role of land mar-
kets was not explicitly considered. Similarly, while many
micro-level empirical studies have attempted to examine the
drivers of land-use change across the globe (Meyfroidt,
Lambin, Erb, & Hertel, 2013), the potential of land markets
— an emerging pathway of importance for farm households
to access cultivable land in forest fringes — has not been
addressed. We address this research gap by examining differ-
ent land acquisition options for farm households in Indonesia,
and the institutional factors that incentivize selection of mar-
ket participation as opposed to direct appropriation of forest
land.
Indonesia, like many other tropical countries, has experi-
enced a rapid depletion of forest resources in favor of a fast
expanding export-oriented agrarian sector (MoF, 2009;
Barraclough, 2013; FAO, 2010; Margono et al., 2012). A
major share of deforestation is caused by large plantation
and mining companies. During 2000–10, companies were
responsible for an estimated 88% of the total area deforested
in the country, while land conversion by farm households only
accounted for 11% (Lee et al., 2014). Nevertheless, the decen-
tralized activities by farm households are much more difficult
to monitor and regulate and hence become a critical challenge
for forest conservation (Indrarto et al., 2012). Land markets in
Indonesia are largely informal, with land transactions often
lacking proper documentation and registration. This makes
it difficult to generate data on land transactions at meso-
and macro-levels.
Here, we use micro-level survey data to examine the links
between the emergence of land markets and forest land appro-
priation, the two major pathways of land acquisition for farm
households in Indonesia. We examine determinants of land
acquisition through markets versus forest land appropriation
and possible connections between these two pathways. We
also analyze the role of land property rights. We use the term
‘‘forest land appropriation” in a broad sense, referring to
state-owned forest as well as forest owned by village commu-
nities under customary law. Furthermore, we use the term
‘‘deforestation” to refer to the act of clearing forest land
regardless of land ownership. The term ‘‘land market transac-
tion” is used here for any voluntary purchase or sale of land in
exchange for money. Land rental agreements are not included,
because tenants usually do not make longer-term land-use
decisions, such as clearing forest or establishing plantation
crops. Most land market transactions involve signing a civil
agreement of ownership transfer with village officials as key
witnesses; this can occur with or without formal land titles,
as is explained in more detail below.
The data for this research were collected in Jambi Province,
Sumatra, and include details on land-use changes and landmar-
ket transactions by local households over a period of more than
20 years (1992–2015). Jambi Province provides a typical exam-
ple for the deforestation process in Indonesia, as the local land
use has undergone significant changes during the last few dec-
ades, including the conversion of primary forests to rubber
agroforests, and later to intensive rubber and oil palm planta-
tions (Wilcove, Giam, Edwards, Fisher, & Koh, 2013). About
43% of the 2.7 million hectares of primary forest standing in
1990 were lost in the province by 2010 (Margono et al., 2012).
While different private and public companies are producing
palm oil in Jambi on large landholdings, farm households still
dominate much of the rubber sector and are also involved in
oil palm cultivation to a significant extent (Euler, Schwarze,
Siregar, & Qaim, 2016; Gatto, Wollni, & Qaim, 2015).The next section provides background information about
Indonesia’s evolving land governance system and Sumatra’s
socio-demographic heterogeneity. The conceptual framework
is presented in Section 3, leading to concrete hypotheses that
are tested empirically in subsequent sections. Data sources
and empirical methods are described in Sections 4 and 5.
Empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 6,
whereas Section 7 concludes.2. LAND GOVERNANCE IN INDONESIA
(a) Evolution of land governance since the 1960s
During the Dutch colonial rule and the early independence
era, land governance in Indonesia was based on indigenous
customary tenure (adat), which varied between different
regions of the country (Szczepanski, 2002). One of the most
important land governance legislations during the post-
independence era was the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL), which
was enacted in 1960 and later complemented by a number of
other laws, regulations, and decrees (Susanti & Budidarsono,
2014). While the BAL was primarily aimed at unifying the dif-
ferent land laws into a single system, it conditionally recog-
nized customary rights of rural communities. A significant
shift in land governance occurred under the ‘‘New Order
Regime” (1967–98). Specifically, legislations enabling forestry
and mining leases were enacted, including the Forestry Law of
1967, which set the framework for forest management for the
following three decades. The Forestry Law entailed a disen-
franchising of the rural population from forest resources,
and adat institutions were overlooked (Haverfield, 1999).
Around 70% of the country’s territory was delegated as state
forest land (kawasan hutan) under the jurisdiction of the Min-
istry of Forestry (Indrarto et al., 2012; Susanti &
Budidarsono, 2014). Kawasan hutan also included many
unregistered plots that were already used by local people for
agricultural cultivation when the Forestry Law was enacted.
The government also did not recognize land rights of farm
households over forest plots that were illegally converted after
1967. However, even without formal recognition, local farm
households continued to clear forest land for crop production,
claiming de facto ownership rights (Johnson & Nelson, 2004;
Peluso, 2005). There exists a strong conviction by farm house-
holds that such de facto tenure is secure within the village com-
munity (Resosudarmo et al., 2013).
Market transactions of land hardly occurred in many parts
of rural Indonesia till the 1980s, partly due to the fact that
only a small share of the total land was formally titled. In
1981, the Indonesian government introduced the National
Agrarian Operation Project (PRONA), a program to reduce
transaction costs involved in land titling. However, by the
end of the 20th century only less than 20% of all registrable
plots (about 10% in rural areas) had actually been titled
(Fitzpatrick, 1997; Slaats, Rajagukguk, Elmiyah, & Safik,
2009). From the early-1990s, the government intensified its
efforts to develop a reliable land titling system over non-
forest land. PRONA was largely replaced by the Land Admin-
istration Project (LAP), financially supported by the World
Bank and the Australian Government. The objective of LAP
is to title all agrarian land in Indonesia by 2020 (Thorburn,
2004).
At present, two ways of obtaining formal titles are possible
for agrarian land: (i) systematic titling, where usually a large
number of contiguous plots across different users can be regis-
tered at a subsidized rate, and (ii) sporadic titling, where a
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PRONA primarily covered sporadic titling, LAP aims for sys-
tematic titling (Slaats et al., 2009). During the first phase of
LAP (1994–2001), about two million plots of land were regis-
tered in Indonesia, mostly in West Java (Reerink & van
Gelder, 2010). Although systematic titles are generally consid-
ered more secure, the application requires significant docu-
mentation from land owners and hence the process is often
time-consuming. On the other hand, access to formal credit
is significantly higher when farm households can use their sys-
tematic title as collateral. Although designed as an intermedi-
ary step in the process of land certification, sporadic titles are
now considered by many farm households as a cheaper substi-
tute that does not require any validation from the National
Land Agency (Kunz, Hein, Mardiana, & Faust, 2016).
Customary land rights, which are not easily amenable to
individualization and titling, still apply in many parts of
Indonesia (Slaats et al., 2009), and could be excluded from
the institutional purview of land markets. Further, the state
law allows land owners to transfer their ownership rights
through civil agreements even without any titles (Lindsey,
1998; USAID, 2010). At present, state kawasan hutan, commu-
nal adat land, and private land co-exist in Indonesia.
(b) Land acquisition pathways in Sumatra
Farm households in Indonesia use different pathways of
land acquisition. The most common pathways nowadays
include inheritance or inter-vivo transfers, forest land appro-
priation, and purchases in the land market. In Sumatra, an
additional form of land acquisition has had major impacts
on land governance: the government’s transmigration pro-
gram, which gained momentum in the late-1980s and early-
1990s (Susanti & Budidarsono, 2014). Transmigrant families
from Java were settled in newly created transmigrant villages
in Sumatra in isolation from the autochthonous Melayu pop-
ulation. Transmigrant families were allocated plots of land for
crop cultivation, for which they could easily obtain formal
land titles (Gatto, Wollni, Asnawi, & Qaim, 2017). While
the transmigration program slowed down since the late-
1990s, it continues to have important implications for land
ownership structures in rural Sumatra. Many of the former
transmigrants hold formal land titles, whereas the majority
of the autochthonous population has de facto land rights
under customary law. Customary land rights mostly do not
apply to migrants from outside the community, that is,
migrants cannot easily establish de facto rights unless they
have a formal title.
Nowadays, forest land appropriation and market transac-
tions are the two most prevalent pathways of land acquisition
in the study area in Jambi Province. Since appropriation of
state forest land (kawasan hutan) has been illegal, obtaining
de jure rights for such converted forest land is very difficult.
Nevertheless, many farm households in Sumatra, especially
those from the autochthonous population, perceive cultivation
on such appropriated forest land as secure de facto
(Resosudarmo et al., 2013). On the other hand, especially
migrant households clearly prefer de jure property rights
through formal titles when purchasing land.3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
The relationship between land market development and
deforestation driven by farm households is not straightfor-
ward. The evolution of land markets may reduce the need todirectly appropriate the forest land for cultivation. Following
Boserup (1965), a shift from direct appropriation to land pur-
chases is considered as an institutional response to growing
population pressure, land scarcity, and commercialization of
agriculture. In addition, investment in improved land gover-
nance and strengthening of property rights are seen as prereq-
uisites for land markets to effectively curtail deforestation and
promote sustainable use of land resources (Streck, 2009).
Much of the policy support for land market development is
based on these notions.
Figure 1 provides a framework that includes the key eco-
nomic drivers of decision-making about alternative pathways
of land acquisition in a heterogeneous farming community.
The horizontal axis shows the distance of a cultivable plot
from the market center (center of economic activity). Two
types of plots are considered: plots with de jure property right
protection through a formal land title, and plots without for-
mal title that may or may not have de facto rights under cus-
tomary law. The vertical axis shows the shadow price of land,
capturing the economic value of agricultural production and
also any non-pecuniary values. 1 The real market price and
the opportunity cost of labor are also depicted on the vertical
axis. The cost of cultivation increases with distance from the
market center, because of rising transportation costs and fac-
tors of production other than land becoming less accessible.
This cost increase is assumed to limit the expansion of agricul-
ture to more remote locations.
Building on a spatially-explicit von Thu¨nen model (e.g.,
Angelsen, 2010), we assume that land is allocated to the
use that generates the highest land rent. Heterogeneity in
the farming community is explicitly addressed using differen-
tial shadow price functions for two types of farm households:
non-migrants (autochthonous) and migrants. The shadow
price of land used by non-migrants is depicted as R1R1, which
declines with distance from the market. We assume human
labor as the major limiting factor of production, and the
agricultural frontier to be determined by the opportunity cost
of labor, which is a positive function of distance (LL1). As
long as the potential rent from land is positive
(R1R1 P LL

1), the land will be under agricultural production
(region OF 0). Beyond that point, the land will be under for-
est. The shaded area in Figure 1 could contain some of the
traditionally cultivated plots. These plots, being managed pri-
vately for a longer period of time, are assumed to have or be
eligible for de jure property right protection. This is the base-
line scenario against which the potentials of land markets are
evaluated.
Let us now suppose that migrants bring improved cultiva-
tion skills or are able to adopt cash crops (e.g., oil palm),
which are labor-saving and/or land-sparing compared to the
traditional land use followed by the local population (e.g.,
paddy, rubber). In-migration and introduction of labor-
saving land uses will increase the labor availability in the vil-
lage economy, thereby shifting the opportunity cost of labor
in farming downward (LL2). Migrants could acquire cultivable
land either through the land market or through forest land
appropriation. This decision depends primarily on their per-
ception of the degree of internal (de facto) tenure security over
appropriated forest land vis-a`-vis the external (de jure) tenure
security over the titled land available in the market. Adjusting
for the risk of expropriation, the shadow price curve for the
migrant household is depicted as R2wR2. The kinked function
illustrates a typical situation of differential shadow prices for
plots with varying degree of property rights security. The plots
without de jure property rights are valued less in the market. If
no land market exists in the village, an increasing demand for
Figure 1. Potential impact of market development on deforestation in a heterogeneous farming community. Notes: Shaded area (OF 0) shows de jure cultivable
area. Beyond F0 lies the forest land (already appropriated or unappropriated). R1R

1 and R2wR

2, are the shadow price functions of land, LL

1 and LL

2 are the
opportunity cost of labor, and M1nM1 and M2qM

2 are land market price functions.
338 WORLD DEVELOPMENTcultivable land due to an expanding labor base will result in
additional forest land appropriation; the amount of additional
deforestation through migration would be the segment
between F 0 and F 1.
Let us also assume a land market price function, represented
by M1nM1 as a negative function of distance from the market
center. Land transactions in the market would occur only in
the region OP 1, as the market price (M1k) lies below the sha-
dow value of land for a share of migrant households (R2h)
but above the expected shadow value for non-migrants
(R1k). The differences in shadow prices of land between house-
holds could arise due to a number of factors, including differ-
ences in managerial skills, easy access to working capital, and
opportunity cost of family labor, among others. Of course,
autochthonous households that are selling land could subse-
quently engage in forest land appropriation (deforestation)
to acquire additional land. As explained, the internal (de facto)
tenure security over appropriated forest land is perceived
higher by autochthonous farm households than by migrants.
Therefore, autochthonous farm households could have an
incentive to sell titled land with de jure property protection
in segment R1k to migrants and then appropriate forest land
for own cultivation within segment (F 1F 2). In this case, de
facto property rights for some of the land would contribute
to additional deforestation.
The model suggests that an increase in socioeconomic
heterogeneity, resulting in different shadow prices of land
and different preferences for de facto property rights over con-
verted forest land by migrants and non-migrants, could spur
the development of land markets and appropriation of addi-
tional forest land. Identifying the characteristics of farm
households involved in different land acquisition pathways is
hence a necessary step toward linking deforestation and landmarket development. We propose the following hypothesis
to be tested:
Hypothesis 1. ‘‘Households involved in forest land appropria-
tion are different in terms of their socioeconomic characteristics
from households that purchase land in the market. Differences
are especially expected in terms of households’ migration status
and ethnicity.”
Confirmation of this hypothesis could mean that selling cul-
tivable land to migrants provides an incentive to autochtho-
nous households to deforest further. However, this alone
would not prove that the emergence of land markets affects
deforestation. Land prices are another important element that
needs scrutiny.
The cultivable land could be severely undervalued, especially
when it cannot be protected by de jure property rights. In the
conceptual model in Figure 1, this would imply that prices in
the land market are lower than the shadow value for non-
migrants, for instance, the market price curve could be
M2qM2. In that case, fewer autochthonous households would
be willing to sell land in the market; sales would only occur in
the segment OP 2. This leads to two additional, interconnected
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a. ‘‘The lack of de jure property rights leads to
undervaluation of land in the market.”Hypothesis 2b. ‘‘Due to the undervaluation of land, own cultiva-
tion in appropriated forest land is more profitable for farm
households than selling the land in the market.”
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The main source of data for this study is a survey of farm
households in Jambi Province, Sumatra. This survey was car-
ried out in two rounds, the first round in 2012 and the second
in 2015. Farm households to be included were sampled in five
regencies (Sarolangun, Bungo, Tebo, Batanghari, and Muaro
Jambi). These regencies comprise the largest part of the low-
land region in Jambi, 2 where most of the deforestation
occurred during recent decades. Four districts per regency
and two villages per district were randomly selected, resulting
in a total of 40 villages in 20 districts. In addition, five villages
near to the Bukit Duabelas National Park and the Harapan
Rainforest, where supporting research activities were carried
out (Clough, Krishna, Corre, et al., 2016), were purposively
selected.
A map with the location of sample villages is shown in Fig-
ure 2. In each village, complete household lists were compiled,
from which farm households were randomly selected. The
number of sampled households per village was adjusted to
the village population size. 3 In 2012, we surveyed a total of
701 farm households. In 2015, we targeted the same house-
holds and were able to cover most of them again; with 6%
the attrition rate was low. 4 The small number of households
that could not be surveyed again were replaced with other ran-
domly selected households in the same villages, thus keeping
the sample size and structure constant across the two survey
rounds.Figure 2. Sample villageFace-to-face interviews with the household heads were con-
ducted in Indonesian language by a team of enumerators, who
were trained and supervised by the researchers. Historical data
on land acquisition and land-use changes were collected
through a recall for all plots owned in both survey rounds.
In case of land-use change following an ownership change,
the original land-use type was also recorded. Since land trans-
actions are non-frequent events, survey respondents did not
find it difficult to recall details such as land prices and land
use changes, even when referring to periods in the more distant
past. The data from the two surveys were cross-checked; mis-
matches were followed up directly in the field. In total, we
gathered information on 1,681 plantation plots owned by
the sample households. Oil palm and rubber account for more
than 95% of the total area cultivated by sample households.
In addition to the farm household survey, a village-level sur-
vey was carried out in the same villages in 2012 (Gatto et al.,
2015, 2017). The village survey focused on land-use changes
and related institutional aspects at the village level covering
three points in time, namely 1992, 2002, and 2012. During
the farm household survey in 2015, we also updated some of
the village-level data. We use selected variables from this
village-level survey to explain land acquisition decisions by
farm households. 5
Based on the household survey data, four main pathways of
land acquisition are identified. The last column of Table 1
shows that 49% of the plots presently cultivated with planta-
tion crops were purchased in the land market, 18% weres in Jambi Province.
Table 1. Pathways of land acquisition and land use at the time of acquisition
Land use at the time of land acquisition Overall
Crops Grass and bush Forest No information
Percentage of plots under different land uses at the time of acquisition
Acquisition pathway Market purchase 64.24 63.73 19.62 0.87 48.66
Direct appropriation 0.30 0.41 71.53 0.00 18.02
Government program 0.00 0.00 0.00 97.39 6.66
Inheritance or inter–vivo transfer 30.30 33.81 8.61 1.74 23.97
Other 5.15 2.05 0.24 0.00 2.68
Overall 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean (std. error) of plot size in hectares
Acquisition pathway Market purchase 2.27 2.45 3.35 1.50 2.45
(0.12) (0.13) (0.80) (0.11)
Direct appropriation 2.50 1.25 2.58 –– 2.57
(0.50) (0.75) (0.13) (0.13)
Government program –– –– –– 1.80 1.80
(0.10) (0.10)
Inheritance and inter–vivo transfer 1.92 1.60 1.73 1.25 1.77
(0.11) (0.09) (0.17) (0.75) (0.07)
Other 1.30 1.80 12.00 –– 1.65
(0.21) (0.48) (0.30)
Overall 2.12 2.15 2.68 1.79 2.24
(0.09) (0.09) (0.19) (0.09) (0.06)
Number of plots 660 488 418 115 1681
340 WORLD DEVELOPMENTacquired through appropriation of forest land, 7% were allo-
cated as part of government programs, especially the transmi-
gration program, and 24% were obtained through inheritance
or inter-vivo transfers. Table 1 also shows that the role of the
different pathways varies by the type of land use at the time of
land acquisition. For plots already cultivated with crops at the
time of acquisition, market transactions and inheritance or
inter-vivo transfers play the dominant role. The same holds
true for grass and bush land. Grass and bush land, locally
referred to as ‘‘sleeping land” (lahan tidur), is former forest
land where the timber has already been extracted. 6 Unsurpris-
ingly, forest land was primarily acquired through direct appro-
priation, although some forested plots were also purchased in
the land market.
Figure 3 shows how the role of the different pathways of
land acquisition has developed over time. Cumulative area
shares are shown in Figure S1 (Supplementary Material).
While a few plots had already been acquired before 1985,
almost 90% of the area cultivated by farm households in
2015 was acquired after 1990. During the 1980s and early-
1990s, around half of all the plots were acquired through
direct forest land appropriation. Over time, land market trans-
actions clearly gained in relative and absolute importance,
reaching their peak during 2005–07. Possibly due to low mar-
ket prices for rubber and palm oil in recent years, land market
transactions declined after 2012. The area acquired through
direct forest appropriation also declined more recently, point-
ing at increasing scarcity of forest land.
Figure 4 shows the changes in forest cover in Jambi Pro-
vince since 1990 using remote sensing data combined with data
on land market transactions from the household survey. The
area covered with forest declined drastically. By 2012, most
of the forest outside of protected conservation areas had van-
ished (Drescher et al., 2016). During the same period, land
market activities increased substantially. This could be an indi-
cation that the land deforested ends up being traded in the
land market. However, it is not clear whether the existence
of a land market caused deforestation.5. EMPIRICAL METHODS
In this section, we describe the methods used to test the
hypotheses that were developed in Section 3.
(a) Testing of hypothesis 1
To test whether households involved in forest land appro-
priation have different migration status and other socioeco-
nomic characteristics than households involved in land
purchases we use regression models with dummies for land
acquisition pathways as dependent variables. Three dummy
variables are defined to capture land ownership change during
1992–2015: D1i ¼ 1 if household i purchased land from the
market (0 otherwise), D2i ¼ 1 if the household sold land in
the market (0 otherwise), and D3i ¼ 1 if the household was
involved in forest land appropriation (0 otherwise). 7 House-
holds that were not involved in any of these activities after
1992 are excluded from the analysis. To account for possible
error term correlation between the three equations, we employ
a multivariate probit model:
D1i ¼ f ðxiÞ þ ei ð1aÞ
D2i ¼ gðxiÞ þ ti ð1bÞ
D3i ¼ hðxiÞ þ xi ð1cÞ
where xi is a vector of household socioeconomic characteris-
tics that may influence decisions on land acquisition and sales.
We are particularly interested in the roles of migration and
ethnicity, although we control for a broader set of socioeco-
nomic factors. The error terms ei, ti, and xi are assumed to
be identically distributed as bivariate normal with zero mean
and unit variance.
The hypothesis of exogeneity of Djðj ¼ 1; 3Þ is tested as
H 0 : q1 ¼ 0, and for Djðj ¼ 2; 3Þ as H 0 : q2 ¼ 0. Here, q1 and
q2 are the correlation coefficients between ei and xi, and
Figure 3. Cultivated land acquired through different pathways over time. Notes: Total number of plots under cultivation by sample households in 2015: 1681.
Aggregated cultivated area: 3770 ha. Trend lines were calculated with three-year moving averages.
Figure 4. Change in forest cover and land market activity in Jambi. Notes: Forest cover changes are derived from Drescher et al. (2016) and land market
activity from authors’ household survey data.
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342 WORLD DEVELOPMENTbetween ti and xi, respectively. Significant coefficient estimates
for xi and differences between the three equations would lead
to non-rejection of hypothesis 1. Furthermore, a negative esti-
mate for q1 would indicate that land purchase and forest land
appropriation activities are less likely to occur in the same
households.
In addition to this model at the household level, we also esti-
mate a probit model at the plot level. For the plot-level model,
we define D4pi ¼ 1 if household i purchased plot p from the
market, and 0 if the plot was acquired through direct forest
appropriation. Plots that were acquired already before 1992
or were obtained through other pathways are excluded from
this model. Since several households acquired more than one
plot during the 1992–2015 period, unobserved household char-
acteristics could lead to intra-class correlation. To adjust the
model to the data structure we use a multilevel mixed-effects
probit (MMEP) with random intercepts #i at the household
level, as follows (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). 8
D4pi ¼ hðxi; zpiÞ þ #i þ upi ð2Þ
where zpi is a vector of plot-level characteristics such as dis-
tance to the farm households’ place of residence. Again, we
are particularly interested in the coefficient estimates for xi.
Statistical significance would mean that socioeconomic char-
acteristics matter for the land acquisition pathway, even after
controlling for plot-level differences. This would further sup-
port hypothesis 1.
(b) Testing of hypotheses 2a and 2b
To test whether appropriated land is undervalued in the
market such that own cultivation would be more lucrative
than selling the land (hypothesis 2b), we compare land market
prices reported by farm households in our sample (adjusted
for inflation) with financial gains from oil palm and rubber
cultivation, as reported by Euler, Krishna, Schwarze,
Siregar, and Qaim (2017) and Krishna, Euler, Siregar, and
Qaim (2017) for Jambi Province. To test whether the underval-
uation of land in the market is due to the lack of de jure prop-
erty rights protection (hypothesis 2a), we compare land
market prices with and without land titles at the time of plot
acquisition. For the titled land, we differentiate between sys-
tematic and sporadic titles. Significantly higher prices for titled
land would support hypothesis 2a.
We also estimate hedonic regression models to get further
insights into what determines land prices in the market. The
hedonic regression analysis only considers those plots that
were actually traded in the market. We apply a power trans-
formation to the data as proposed by Box and Cox (1964).
Using a Box-Cox transformation following land valuation
studies (e.g., Snyder, Kilgore, Hudson, & Donnay, 2007;
Standiford & Scott, 2008), the market price is regressed on a
time variable and a vector of plot characteristics, such as plot
size, location, and previous land use at the time of the transac-
tion as well as a variable indicating the degrees of tenure secu-
rity. In a separate model, international market prices of rubber
and palm oil are also used as explanatory variables, as these
are expected to influence the land rent, which in turn is
assumed to be a key determinant of the market value of land.
Prices that local farm households receive for their harvest are
different from international market prices due to transaction
and processing costs and exploitation of market power by
local traders and companies. Nevertheless, a strong correla-
tion between farm-gate prices in Jambi and international mar-
ket prices is observed (Kopp, Alamsyah, Fatricia, & Bru¨mmer,
2014). Average export prices of palm oil and rubber for thethree years prior to the land transaction are used as proxies
for the expected land rent.
Confirmation of hypotheses 2a and 2b would suggest that
the evolution of land markets has not significantly contributed
to forest land appropriation, due to the specific institutional
context with weak property protection. To gain further
insights into this relationship, we also look at the direct corre-
lation between land market developments and deforestation at
the village level. Data on deforestation are taken from the
village-level survey: deforestation is measured in terms of the
net permanent change in forest land during the period 1992–
2002. Land market developments are based on the farm
household survey. We measure the share of plots transacted
in the market relative to the total number of plots acquired
by farm households living in a particular village for two time
periods, namely 1992–2015 and 2002–2015. Insignificant cor-
relation coefficients would suggest that land market develop-
ments and deforestation are not directly related.6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
(a) Analysis of land acquisition decisions
To analyze whether farm households involved in forest land
appropriation are different from those who acquired land
through the land market (hypothesis 1), we use a multivariate
probit model at the household level, as explained above. Key
results are shown in Table 2 (full estimation results are shown
in Table S2 in the Supplementary Material). The time variable
(time of acquisition of first plot) indicates that households that
started agricultural production more recently are less likely to
be involved in forest land appropriation (Eqn. (1c)) or land
sales (Eqn. (1b)), whereas the effect on the probability of land
purchases (Eqn. (1a)) is not statistically significant. One main
factor that prevents newly established farm households from
forest land appropriation is the reduced availability of forests
in the immediate village surroundings. Decentralization policy
after 1999 probably plays a lesser role, because regional gov-
ernments still only have minor authority in terms of forest
planning (Susanti & Budidarsono, 2014).
The results also confirm that aspects related to migration
and ethnicity play an important role for households’ land
acquisition decisions. Households that migrated to one of
the transmigrant villages are more likely to acquire land from
the market and less likely to be involved in forest land appro-
priation than autochthonous households. One reason is that
transmigrant villages were artificially created through the gov-
ernment’s transmigration program during the 1980s and
1990s. In these villages, community structures are less tradi-
tional, and customary land claims over forest land do not
apply to the same extent as in autochthonous villages. Another
reason why land market transactions are more common in
transmigrant villages is that most of the transmigrant house-
holds have formal titles for the land allocated to them by
the government. Formal land titles facilitate later sales.
But even in autochthonous villages, migrants are more likely
to acquire land through market purchase, because people
coming from outside the community cannot easily obtain de
facto property rights for appropriated forest land. This is also
supported by the statistical significance of estimation coeffi-
cients for Javanese and Sundanese ethnicities, both originating
from Java. Farm households belonging to these ethnicities are
more likely to purchase land (Eqn. (1a)) and less likely to
appropriate forest land (Eqn. (1c)). The reference ethnicity
in this model is the autochthonous Melayu population, which
Table 2. Determinants of land market transaction and direct forest land appropriation by farm households during 1992–2015
Explanatory variables (unit) Multivariate probit at household level Multi-level probit at plot level
Eqn. (1a): Land purchase
[1 = purchased from market;
0 = otherwise]
Eqn. (1b):
Land sale
[1 = sold in
the market;
0 = otherwise]
Eqn. (1c): Appropriation
[1 = direct forest
appropriation;
0 = otherwise]
Eqn. (2): Acquisition pathway
[1 = plot purchased from the
market 0 = plot acquired
through direct forest
appropriation]
Time of acquisition of first plot of household [year] 0.016 0.047*** 0.067*** 0.065**
(0.011) (0.017) (0.015) (0.022)
Household head’s education [years of formal education] 0.007 0.021 0.029 0.016
(0.017) (0.024) (0.021) (0.042)
Household migrated to transmigrant village [dummy] 0.483*** 0.376 0.747*** 2.380***
(0.187) (0.267) (0.263) (0.637)
Household migrated to autochthonous/ traditional village [dummy] 0.344** 0.298 0.051 0.528
(0.157) (0.235) (0.187) (0.385)
Javanese or Sundanese ethnicity [dummy] 0.418*** 0.169 0.316* 1.243**
(0.152) (0.227) (0.186) (0.432)
Altitude of place of residence [meters] 4.E04 0.003 0.009*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Household wealth [number of bedrooms at the time of household establishment] 0.095 0.041 0.062 0.007
(0.070) (0.099) (0.086) (0.172)
Household belongs to any of the purposively selected villages [dummy] 0.607*** 0.332 0.386 1.959**
(0.223) (0.283) (0.262) (0.636)
Presence of forest in the village in 1992 [dummy] 0.225 0.203 0.627*** 1.375**
(0.166) (0.236) (0.223) (0.519)
Correlation of error term with that in Eqn. (1c) 0.291*** (0.092) 0.147 (0.111) –
Number of observations 483 729
Log-likelihood 627.491 278.488
Wald v2 statistic 126.484*** 29.58**
Notes: Figures in parentheses show std. errors. ***p  0.01, **p  0.05, *p  0.10. Full model results with additional explanatory variables included are shown in Table S2 (Supplementary Material).
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Table 3. Average land market prices across land use and land title at the time of acquisition
Number of plots Median market price [million IDR per ha] Test statistic for equality of median prices#
Plantation crops
Systematic title 72 41.63
Sporadic title 32 30.32
Absence of formal title 158 20.41
Overall 262 25.55 10.96***
Grass and bush land
Systematic title 24 11.94
Sporadic title 24 10.23
Absence of formal title 160 7.53
Overall 208 8.00 2.27
Forest
Systematic title 6 8.77
Sporadic title 4 2.46
Absence of formal title 42 4.66
Overall 52 4.90 3.76
Notes: Plantation crops include oil palm and rubber. #To test the difference between the land prices across different land
title categories, a non-parametric k-sample test statistic on equality for medians was estimated. ***p  0.01. 1 US
$ = 9.37 thousand IDR in 2012 and 13.39 IDR in 2015 (World Bank, 2016).
344 WORLD DEVELOPMENTis more likely to appropriate forest land as a legitimate strat-
egy for securing de facto property rights under communal
law. 9 The negative correlation between the error terms in
Eqns. (1a) and (1c), which is shown in the bottom part of
Table 2, also suggests that households involved in land pur-
chase are mostly not the same as those involved in forest land
appropriation.Table 4. Hedonic models of
Year of transaction [1992 = 0, .., 2015 = 23]
Square of year of transaction
Change in export price of palm oil from previous year [%]
Change in export price of rubber from previous year [%]
Interaction: Change in export price of palm oil  Change in export price o
Plot characteristics
Land use at time of transaction
Plantation crops [oil palm or rubber, dummy]
Interaction: Plantation crops  Year of transaction
Forest [dummy]
Interaction: Forest  Year of transaction
Possession of land titles at the time of transaction [dummies, reference: hav
Systematic
Sporadic
Buyer characteristics
Household head’s education [years of schooling]
Javanese and Sundanese ethnicity [dummy]
Migrant to transmigrant villages [dummy]
Migrant to non-transmigrant villages [dummy]
Village characteristics
Village with no forest in 1992 [dummy]
Village with more than 50% forest loss during 1992–2002 [dummy]
Box-Cox transformation parameter, h
Test for h = 1 (inverse function)
h = 0 (log function)
h = + 1 (linear function)
Log-likelihood
LR v2
Number of observations
Notes: Figures in parentheses show std. errors. ***p  0.01, **p  0.05, *p  0
shown in Table S5 (Supplementary Material).One other result worth highlighting is the positive and sig-
nificant coefficient of the presence of forest in the village in
1992 in Eqn. (1c). Having forest in the village increases the
probability of deforestation activities. At the same time, the
forest variable is not significant in Eqn. (1b), suggesting that
there is no association with the probability of land sales.
The correlation between the error terms in Eqns. (1b) andland prices (1992–2015)
Model (a) Model (b) Model (c)
0.087*** (0.014) 0.063 (0.058)
0.006*** (0.002)
0.008*** (0.003)
0.014*** (0.004)
f rubber 4.E04*** (1.E04)
1.522*** (0.173) 1.223*** (0.460) 1.633*** (0.172)
0.020 (0.031)
0.555* (0.296) 0.752 (0.664) 0.603** (0.293)
0.012 (0.049)
ing no titles]
0.546** (0.234) 0.567** (0.236) 0.445** (0.233)
0.232 (0.268) 0.195 (0.270) 0.317 (0.267)
0.032 (0.024) 0.032 (0.024) 0.050** (0.023)
0.764*** (0.207) 0.728*** (0.209) 0.652*** (0.205)
0.274 (0.244) 0.253 (0.246) 0.237 (0.242)
0.052 (0.232) 0.039 (0.234) 0.010 (0.231)
1.072*** (0.292) 1.069*** (0.294) 1.079*** (0.289)
0.295 (0.240) 0.294 (0.242) 0.411* (0.238)
0.189*** (0.021) 0.194*** (0.022) 0.180*** (0.022)
3555.81*** 4085.58*** 3387.77***
81.09*** 2346.33*** 69.24***
1012.2*** 2808.73*** 1001.65***
2308.17 2304.02 2222.11
228.43*** 236.74*** 218.08***
581 581 562
.10. Full model results with additional explanatory variables included are
LAND MARKETS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND DEFORESTATION: INSIGHTS FROM INDONESIA 345(1c) is insignificant, suggesting that decisions to appropriate
forest land and to sell land in the market are unrelated.
Complementing the household-level analysis, we also esti-
mate a multi-level probit model at the plot level, explaining
the factors that influence whether a plot was either purchased
in the market or acquired through direct forest appropriation.
Key results from this multi-level probit model are shown in the
last column of Table 2 (full results are shown in Table S2 in
the Supplementary Material). The results are consistent with
those from the household-level analysis. For example, the pos-
itive and significant coefficient for the time of acquisition vari-
able confirms that the role of market transactions increased
over time, while direct forest appropriation became less rele-
vant. Moreover, migrants from Java are more likely to acquire
a plot through market purchase than autochthonous Melayu
households, even after controlling for plot location and other
characteristics.
The models in Table 2 were estimated using observations
from all households surveyed in 2012 and 2015. As explained
above, some attrition occurred during the second survey
round. To test whether attrition leads to any systematic bias,
we re-estimated the models including observations only from
those households that were interviewed in both survey rounds.
These results are shown in Table S3 (Supplementary Mate-
rial). In Table S4 (Supplementary Material), we re-estimated
the models with all observations but additionally including vil-
lage fixed effects. 10 These additional results are very similar to
those in Table 2, which underlines the robustness of the find-
ings.
(b) Analysis of land prices
To test whether the lack of de jure property rights for appro-
priated forest land leads to undervaluation in the land market
(hypothesis 2a), we compare prices observed in market trans-
actions for land with different degrees of property protection.Figure 5. Correlation between deforestation and market development at the villag
are statistically insignificant (p > 0.10). Forest area lost (horizoResults are shown in Table 3 (prices referring to different
points in time are adjusted for inflation). As the type of land
use on a plot at the time of the transaction can also affect
prices, we differentiate between plantation crops (oil palm
and rubber), grass and bush land, and forest. The comparisons
show that land under plantation crops fetches the highest
average prices in the market, followed by grass and bush land,
and then forest land. More importantly, in all three categories,
land with systematic land titles is priced higher than land with
only sporadic titles or no titles at all. Due to the small number
of observations in some of the categories, not all of the differ-
ences are statistically significant, but the patterns observed
clearly suggest that de jure property rights affect land market
prices. We will return to this issue below.
The average market price for grass and bush land, the typ-
ical state where farm households decide whether to establish a
plantation or to sell the plot, is calculated at 8 million Indone-
sian Rupiah (IDR) (US$ 597) per hectare in 2015 prices, which
is significantly below the financial gains from oil palm and
rubber plantations (Euler et al., 2017; Krishna et al.,
2017). 11 One of the most plausible explanations for the under-
valuation of land in the market is weak tenure security. In
2015, only about 50% of all plots in our sample had a formal
land title (either systematic or sporadic). While de facto prop-
erty right protection under customary law might provide suf-
ficient internal tenure security for autochthonous households,
it is insufficient to attract potential buyers, who are predomi-
nantly migrants, to the market. The property rights regula-
tions in Jambi may not prevent forest land appropriation for
own use by autochthonous households, but they do not seem
to encourage forest appropriation for selling land in the mar-
ket. 12
We use hedonic regression models to further analyze the fac-
tors influencing land market prices. Key results are shown in
Table 4 for three different model specifications (full models
are shown in Table S5 in the Supplementary Material).e level. Notes: Number of village observations = 32. Correlation coefficients
ntal axis) refers to state- and community-owned forest land.
346 WORLD DEVELOPMENTRegardless of the exact specification, plots with a systematic
land title at the time of transaction are priced significantly
higher than plots without any land title, which is further con-
firmation of hypothesis 2a. The coefficients for sporadic land
titles are also positive, but not statistically significant. Also
across the different model specifications, the type of land use
on a plot at the time of transaction matters, with plantation
land fetching higher prices than grass and bush land. The
results further suggest that Javanese and Sundanese buyers
pay higher prices per hectare of land than autochthonous
households, holding other factors constant.
Looking more specifically at the different specifications in
Table 4, the time trend in model (a) suggests that land prices
increased over time during 1992–2015. However, results in
model (b), which additionally includes a square term of the
time trend, reveal that land market prices first decreased and
then increased, with a turning point in 2002. In model (c),
instead of the time trend we include information on the devel-
opment of commodity export prices. As export prices for palm
oil and natural rubber are closely correlated, we use percent-
age price changes relative to previous years to avoid multi-
collinearity. The estimates show that international
commodity price developments significantly affect local land
prices and thus land use decisions, which was also observed
in other settings (e.g., Meyfroidt, Phuong, & Anh, 2013).
(c) Links between land markets and deforestation
The multivariate probit estimates above showed that —
while the presence of forest in the village in 1992 was associ-
ated with a higher probability of deforestation — the variable
was not significantly associated with households’ decisions to
participate in the land market as buyer or seller. We also
found that the existing land markets and property rights reg-
ulations provide little incentive for strategic deforestation
aimed at selling appropriated forest land. To conclude, we
examine the meso-level patterns of land market development
and deforestation, using the sub-sample of 32 villages that
had state, communal, or private forests in 1992. While market
transactions of forest land are not often observed in Jambi
Province, there could be indirect effects of land markets on
forest cover (e.g., by inducing speculative trading of land).
We use simple correlation analysis to analyze possible associ-
ations. In Figure 5, deforestation rates during 1992–2002 are
plotted against land market developments during 1992–2015
and 2002–15. The correlation coefficients are small and statis-
tically insignificant, suggesting that the evolution of land mar-
kets has neither promoted nor deterred the deforestation rate
in Jambi.7. CONCLUSION
We have analyzed the relationship between evolving land
markets and forest land appropriation in Sumatra, Indonesia,over the period 1992–2015. If land market transactions had a
direct and positive influence on the decision of farm house-
holds to appropriate forest land, this would support the
hypothesis that land market developments contribute to defor-
estation with immediate policy implications. However, we did
not find evidence for this type of relationship.
Households involved in land market purchases differ from
households involved in appropriating forest land in terms of
their migration status, ethnicity, and other socioeconomic
characteristics. In principle, these differences provide opportu-
nities for Pareto-improving land market transactions that
could entail further deforestation. But we found that appropri-
ated forest land is not extensively traded in the market, which
we largely attribute to weak property right protection. In the
absence of de jure property rights, appropriated forest land
is undervalued in the market, so that own cultivation of plan-
tation crops on this land is much more lucrative than selling
the land. While around 70% of Indonesia’s land territory is
legally declared as state forest land, a large part of this land
is occupied by farm households claiming land rights under
customary law. This legal ambiguity contributes to weak de
jure property rights.
We conclude that land markets did not have significant
effects on forest land appropriation and deforestation by farm
households in Jambi Province. Instead, our data suggest that
forest land appropriation and deforestation were primarily
instigated by a booming export sector and facilitated by legal
ambiguity and high internal tenure security for appropriated
land.
The Indonesian government has ongoing programs to pro-
vide formal land titles for privately owned land. This could
potentially contribute to more deforestation in the future,
especially when global demand for palm oil and rubber contin-
ues to rise. Both stronger property rights and rising global
demand could lead to upward shifts in land prices, which
would provide new incentives for local communities to sell
their land and appropriate new plots through forest encroach-
ment. Alongside land titling programs, it will therefore be cru-
cial to clearly demarcate the forest land together with local
communities and establish effective monitoring systems to
reduce encroachment activities. Such processes could build
the foundation for land markets that contribute to effective
and secure allocation of land resources without negatively
affecting forest cover.CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MANUSCRIPT
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of the study; VVK and CK have collected, analyzed, and inter-
preted the data; VVK, CK, UP, and MQ have written the
manuscript; all authors have approved the final version of
the manuscript.NOTES1. The shadow price of land is determined not only by the marginal
revenue function of agricultural production, but also by the households’
managerial ability and constraints in labor, credit, and land markets
(Deininger & Feder, 2001).2. Regencies are second-level administrative subdivisions in Indonesia,
below the provinces and above the districts (Turner, Podger, Sumardjono,
& Tirthayasa, 2003).
3. Further details of the sampling procedure are provided by Drescher,
Rembold, Allen, et al. (2016).
LAND MARKETS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND DEFORESTATION: INSIGHTS FROM INDONESIA 3474. Forty-one households covered in 2012 could not be re-interviewed in
2015, mostly due to outmigration (23 households), refusal to be
interviewed again (10 households), and death or old age of respondents
(4 households).
5. Summary statistics for key variables from the farm household and
village-level surveys are shown in Table S1 (Supplementary Material).
6. Bush land is sometimes difficult to distinguish from degraded forest. In
some statistics in Indonesia, land with more than 60% canopy tree cover is
classified as forest, whereas land with 25–60% canopy tree cover is
classified as bush land (Romijn et al., 2013). However, with this
classification even some of the plantation crops qualify as forest land.
Here, we classify a plot as grass and bush land if timber extraction was
completed. In contrast, plots where forest trees still existed are classified as
forest land. This classification builds on the responses during the farm
household survey.
7. We do not use dummies for land inheritance or inter-vivo transfers as
these pathways are of lesser importance for land markets and deforesta-
tion.
8. The MMEP model with random intercepts for each household also
accounts for heteroscedastic standard errors due to clustering at the
household level. The estimated intra-class correlation coefficient is +0.81,
demonstrating strong correlation between plots belonging to the same
households.9. Similar differences between ethnicities in terms of communal land
rights were also observed elsewhere (Angelsen, 2001; Angelsen &
Kaimowitz, 1999; Araujo et al., 2009; Mendelsohn, 1994).
10. We also considered using household fixed effects for the plot-level
model, but then decided that this would not be useful in our case for two
reasons. First, the number of households that acquired more than one plot
during the period of observations is relatively small. Second, most of the
explanatory variables of interest (migration status, ethnicity etc.) are time-
invariant, so they would drop out when using household fixed effects.
11. The calculation of financial gains from plantation crops depends on
the discount rate used, and also on market prices of inputs and outputs
and other factors that can vary over time. However, the difference between
the mean market price of untitled bush land (7.5 million IDR per ha) and
the financial gain of a mature oil palm plantation (Krishna et al. (2017)
report 14 million IDR in one year) is so large that reasonable changes in
prices and discount rates will not reverse the comparison.
12. Despite the higher financial returns from land under plantation
crops, about 29% of the sample households had sold part of their land at
some point in time. During the interviews, many of them indicated that
they did so for reasons of financial distress rather than profit-maximizing
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